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Abstract 
The greatest strengths in South Korea’s national innovation system in the early decades have 
become its most serious liabilities in the recent decade, as South Korea has failed to adapt 
itself to the rapidly changing political and economic environment.  This paper first assesses 
the impact of the Asian crisis of 1997 on South Korea’s national innovation system.  The 
crisis has resulted in numerous negative consequences in the short-term, but also provided a 
rare opportunity for South Korea to fix its system in the long-term.  The paper then discusses 
how South Korea has progressed in reengineering the various aspects of the system that has 
bearing on the future competitiveness of its economy.  South Korea will make major changes 
to accommodate to globalization, but increasing globalism will be a means toward a 
nationalist end.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
From 1962 to 1997 South Korea achieved remarkable economic growth, an average of nearly 
eight percent per year.   Such phenomenal growth is largely attributed to a strong national 
innovation system, which functioned effectively from the 1960s through the 1980s.   A 
national innovation system reflects the strengths or weaknesses of a nation in sustaining its 
competitiveness through innovation by its firms in interaction with other firms and 
supporting institutions.   But in 1997, South Korea plummeted down to a serious economic 
crisis.   Unlike previous economic disruptions, which had been evoked by external shocks 
such as oil crises, the 1997 and 1998 crisis that affected South Korea stemmed from 
fundamental structural weaknesses in its institutions that support national innovation.   The 
developmental state consolidated sufficient power to pick “winners” and mobilized and 
allocated resources to them for ambitious developmental goals, achieving phenomenal 
industrial growth in the early decades.  However, this approach eventually led to corruption 
and collusion between the state and big businesses, and mismanagement of the financial 
sector with serious resource misallocation.   The chaebol relied heavily on state protection, 
which resulted in diversification by big businesses beyond their financial and technological 
capabilities.   Lack of transparency and accountability in the economic system was also a 
serious problem.   As a result, the balance of payment in trade declined from $7.6 billion in 
surplus in 1987 to $20.6 billion in deficit in 1996 and accordingly foreign debt increased 
from $31.7 billion in 1990 to $156 billion in 1997.  Recognizing the weak economic system 
and declining competitiveness, foreigners withdrew their investments from South Korea in 
1997, leading to the Asian crisis. 
 
Greek mythology gives an interesting paradox that is still seen in this industrial society.   The 
fabled Icarus constructed powerful wings that enabled him to fly so high, so close to the sun 
that his artificially waxed wings melted and he plunged to his death (Miller, 1990).   The 
paradox also applies to South Korea; greatest strengths in South Korea’s innovation system in 
the past became its most serious liabilities in recent years (Kim 1997, 2000).   South Korea’s 
core competence through the 1980s has become core rigidity in the 1990s according to the 
Leonard-Barton’s term (1995).   
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 After the Asian crisis and the subsequent bailout by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the new government, the first one in South Korean history that changed power through a 
democratic process, launched in early 1998 major reforms in four areas: the public sector, the 
financial sector, chaebols (family-owned large conglomerates), and the labor market.  Most 
of the reform programs had long been discussed but never implemented because of inertia 
and resistance from stakeholders.  Several months prior to the crisis, a major study of the 
SouthKorean economy by Booz, Allen, and Hamilton (1997) reported two surprises.  The 
first is that many good studies were available in South Korea, diagnosing and prescribing the 
problems of its economy.   The second was that none of them had been implemented.  The 
crisis, however, provided South Korea with a rare opportunity to carry out reform programs 
aggressively.  The crisis was painful in the short-term, but a “blessing in disguise” in the 
long-term. 
 
There is no one best way to describe the different innovation systems that characterize 
countries of diverse sizes, stages of economic development, and historical experiences 
(Nelson, 1993).  There are, however, many common features among different definitions 
(Freeman, 1995; Lundvale, 1992; Nelson, 1993).  That is, firms should be at the center of a 
nation’s innovation system because they are the organizations that translate technological 
resources, which the system generates, into innovations.   With firms in the center, an 
innovation system can be seen as a set of interactions among five sectors under four critical 
environments.   The former encompasses the industrial, global, domestic support, financial, 
and education sectors.  The four critical environments include: market and technology, 
government and policy, labor market, and socio-culture. 
 
This paper first discusses the impact of the Asian crisis on South Korea’s system of 
innovation, and then what South Korea has done in attempts to reengineer that system in 
order to improve the performance of the various sectors and create a more conducive 
environment for innovative activities. 
 
 
Innovation in the Aftermath of the Crisis 
The Asian financial crisis has undoubtedly resulted in tremendous economic and social 
consequences in South Korea in terms of rising bankruptcies and unemployment and 
dwindling living standard.   It also affected the various aspects of South Korea’s innovation 
system that have bearings on the future competitiveness of the economy.   
 
Government and Policy Environment 
The South Korean government had been recognized as one of a few relatively successful 
developmental states (Evans, 1995). In 1961 a military coup consolidated sufficient state 
power to mobilize and allocate resources for ambitious developmental goals.  The state 
achieved autonomy from vested interests of the stakeholders, and was competent to formulate 
and implement strategies and policies for rapid economic development in the 1960s and 
1970s.   
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 In the subsequent decades, however, the government changed little in response to radical 
transformation of the social and economic environment.  The military government did make 
structural changes at the central government ministry level over 48 times before 1997, and 
many more incremental changes in operating systems and deregulations.  Despite these 
efforts, the government sector continued to expand and became increasingly rigid. The 
agricultural civil service, for example, grew 500 percent despite a 33 percent decrease in the 
farming population over the past thirty years. The government continued to function as a 
developmental state, hindering the development of a free market economy by authoritative 
dictates, frequent intervention in the market, and unnecessary regulations.   Non-transparent 
policies and inaccessible administration nurtured dubious collusion between the government 
and chaebols, leading to political corruption. The chaebols were unable to launch large-scale 
projects without the support of powerful politicians. Moreover, the government had to rescue 
many financially troubled chaebols under political pressures. In return, illegal contributions 
to politicians and bribery of bureaucrats became widespread in South Korean society. The 
result was serious misallocation of resources, leading to the erosion of competitiveness. In 
addition, the concentration of power in the central government stifled the development of 
local governments. As a result, the competitiveness of the South Korean government sector 
as a whole was ranked 34th, management efficiency 44th, and the degree of its intervention at 
the bottom of 46 countries under a study in 1997 (IMD, 1998).   
 
After the Asian crisis, the elected administration of Kim Dae Jung set government reform as 
one of its highest priorities.   Upon inauguration the incumbent administration took several 
extraordinary measures intended to have lasting effects on the productivity improvement of 
the government sector.   First, the new administration established a permanent government 
body, the Government Reform Office (GRO) headed by an assistant minister, with the 
explicit mandate to reform the public sector.  This office, with a powerful link to budget 
mechanisms, is designed to carry out reform as an institutionalized continual process of self-
innovation, compared to transient ad hoc spurts of changes in the past.   Second, the 
administration invited 19 private consulting organizations to help determine the appropriate 
scope and function of all central government ministries as well as selected local governments, 
and to review their current work and management system.   This is something that had 
previously been unimaginable in a society where civil service comes at the top of the social 
hierarchy.   Third, the post-crisis reform drive differed markedly from similar attempts in the 
past in terms of its scope, comprehensiveness, and intensity.   
 
It is premature to evaluate the outcome of government reform in three years (1998-2001), but 
the downsizing of both the central and local governments has resulted in savings of 
approximately US$3 billion.  Some of the central government functions had also been 
transferred to local governments, outsourced or privatized, or transformed into executive 
agencies.  In addition, the new administration introduced an open career system (20 percent 
of high level positions open to the private sector), performance-based management system, 
various measures to improve flexibility and efficiency in public finance and eliminated half 
of over 11,000 regulations (Kim, 2000b).   In short, the government has implemented more 
reform programs in two years than had been implemented in the previous 50 years.   As a 
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 result, the IMD ranking of competitiveness in the government sector has ascended from 34th 
to 26th in the two years (IMD, 2000).   
 
The Asian crisis also triggered the government to restructure its administrative apparatus for 
coordinating public science and technology efforts.  A separate Ministry of Science and 
Technology appears ostensibly to be an ideal structural arrangement to focus its efforts on 
S&T, but it has, in fact, no power to function adequately in bringing about effective 
coordination across different ministries.  As a result, its function to formulate and implement 
S&T policy has been decoupled from the nation's economic and social development 
programs.  To put S&T at the center stage of its developmental effort, responsibility to 
formulate and implement S&T policy across different industries should be integrated, like in 
some advanced OECD countries, with that to formulate and implement the nation's economic 
policy.  For this purpose, the government established the National Science and Technology 
Council to be chaired by the President of the nation.  Unlike a similar council chaired by the 
statutory Prime Minister in the past, the new organization is expected to bring about more 
effective coordination among fourteen different ministries in the government that are active 
in science and technology.   
 
In pursuing further reform, the government faces new challenges.   First, concerted efforts 
should be rendered to change organizational culture (a new pattern of thoughts and behavior 
of people in the government sector) that is compatible with the logic of the new organization 
and management systems that have been introduced in the past three years.  Organizational 
culture is harder to change than a management system is.  No system can be implemented as 
effectively as designed without support by a compatible culture.  Second, in the wake of rapid 
economic recovery, civil servants are less willing than before to accept painful reform, 
making it difficult to reengineer South Korea’s innovation system.  
 
The Financial Sector 
The financial sector has long been a tool of collusion between the government and the 
chaebols, resulting in major resource misallocation and huge non-performing loans, 
particularly after the Heavy and Chemical Industry program in the 1970s.  This had long been 
recognized as one of the most serious problems in the South Korean economy.  But moral 
hazards on the part of technocrats and politicians have kept the sector from correcting the 
problems.  Such weak financial infrastructure including poor prudential oversight allowed 
excessive foreign borrowing on the short term, leading to panic by foreign investors and 
financial crisis. 
 
The Asian crisis has enabled the new government to take bold steps and to introduce a major 
reform program in the financial sector.  At the outset of the Asian crisis, the National 
Assembly passed legislation to reform the financial system.  The law, among other things, 
has created two public agencies—the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) to review, 
design and supervise the financial system and Korea Asset Management Corporation 
(KAMCO) to buy non-performing loans to recapitalize financial institutions—and made the 
Bank of South Korea independent of the government.   The FSC not only has regulatory 
powers but also operates instruments of financial reform. It closed 16 merchant banks, five 
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 commercial banks, and over 700 secondary financial institutions, giving a shocking signal to 
the public that even banking institutions can fail. The government rescued the “relatively 
better managed” remaining financial institutions by turning non-performing loans into equity 
so that they in turn could negotiate with corporate borrowers.  Several large commercial 
banks have merged into three giant banks.  One large commercial bank has been sold to 
foreign interests, and another is under negotiation with foreigners.   
 
Foreign equity participation in the banks, both large and small, is expected to introduce more 
modern market-oriented banking techniques, accountability, and transparency in operations.   
This should result in a more rational allocation of financial resources. 
 
A major concern in the financial sector is that the injection of public funds to rescue banking 
institutions has resulted in a drastic increase in government ownership of large commercial 
banks and investment trust companies.   The result is that the government now has decisive 
power in the financial sector.  Government intervention in Korea’s banking system was 
necessary to achieve stability following the crisis.  The government plans to privatize its 
ownership by 2002 to enable commercial banks to operate on the basis of market principles.   
But its intervention might have the unintended effect of retarding reforms if bank managers 
continue to hesitate to make decisions without a nod from the appropriate government official.   
 
Industrial Structure: Chaebol Restructuring 
Multi-sector, family-controlled business groups were dominant in pre-war Japan and are 
prevalent in many Asian countries today.  But nowhere else have they been so consistently 
aggressive in diversifying businesses and developing technological capabilities than in South 
Korea.  The South Korean government deliberately created and nurtured chaebols to use 
them as locomotives for rapid economic development.  These chaebols were the backbone of 
industrialization in the labor-intensive industries during the early decades.  They also played 
a major role in expediting technological learning in industry, upgrading South Korea’s 
technological capability and globalizing South Korean business.  They consequently 
generated the lion’s share of production and exports from South Korea.   
 
Behind the successful story of chaebols, there are, however, serious divergences from free 
market principles.  Collusion with powerful government forces resulted in resource 
misallocation and economic inefficiency at the macro level.  The concentration of economic 
power in the hands of a small number of chaebols also resulted in monopolistic exploitation 
at the micro level (Kim, 2000a).  They also stifled the healthy growth of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs).   
 
Over diversification, extremely high debt to equity ratios and the subsidization of 
unprofitable businesses made many chaebols vulnerable to the fluctuation of the international 
economic environment.   Several minor chaebols including the Hanbo, Sammi, Jinro, Haitai, 
Halla, New Core and Kia were in receivership prior to the onset of the Asian crisis, giving a 
serious if unheeded warning of just how vulnerable South Korean chaebols were.   
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 At the outburst of the Asian crisis, which hit the remaining chaebols, the administration of 
Kim Dea Jung set five principles of corporate restructuring: down-scope to focus on core 
businesses, the reduction of debt to equity ratios to below 200 percent by the end of 1999, the 
dismantling of cross-credit guarantees among subsidiaries, management transparency, and 
greater management accountability.    
 
The government has three techniques to force the chaebols to comply with its directives: 
threats to undertake a comprehensive tax audit, the legal prosecution of family owners, and 
withdrawing credits to those debt-ridden firms (Krause, 2000).   
 
To meet the mandate requirement to down-scope and reduce the debt to equity ratio for core 
businesses, chaebols had to sell off many of their unprofitable businesses to foreign firms.   
Hyundai, for instance, decided to focus on five core businesses — automobiles, electronics, 
construction, heavy industry, and financial services.   Samsung concentrated on four core 
businesses — electronics, finance, trade, and services.  LG announced that its main business 
segments would be chemicals/energy, electronics/telecommunications, services, and finances.  
Daewoo, in the middle of its restructuring, had gone bankrupt.  Other smaller chaebols were 
also in the process of a major restructuring of their businesses. 
 
The dominance of chaebols prevented the development and healthy growth of small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs).   In the early 1980s the government belatedly began promoting 
SMEs by establishing SME sanctuaries and by requiring banks to comply with a compulsory 
lending ratio program.  Such programs had little effect on the industrial structure in South Korea, 
and the imbalance between the large and small sectors has mostly remained.  As a result, end-
product assembling chaebols rely heavily on Japan for technology-intensive parts and 
components, which constrains innovation at both large and small firms.   
 
The Asian crisis appears to have catalyzed industrial restructuring in South Korea.  Down-
scoping and down-sizing in chaebols and the recent promotion of venture businesses by the 
government prompted a major surge of high technology venture firms in South Korea.  Their 
number increased from a mere 100 before the Asian crisis to 5,000 in two years by the end of 
1999.  In Spring 2000, more venture firms emerged at the rate of 500 per month, reaching 
more than 7,000 by June 2000, a significant change by any standard. 
 
Global Networks 
South Korean firms have developed extensive global networks with foreign firms that have 
provided capital goods, licensed technology, and OEM orders.  These networks have been a 
major source of technological learning for South Korean firms.  But South Korea has not 
relied heavily on foreign direct investment (FDI) for technological learning.   The proportion 
of FDI to total external borrowing was only 6 percent in South Korea compared with 92 
percent in Singapore, 45 percent in Taiwan, and 21 percent in Brazil (KEB, 1987).  As a 
result, unlike other developing countries, the contribution of FDI to the growth of the South 
Korean GDP in 1972-1980 amounted to only 1.3 percent, while its contribution to total and 
manufacturing value-added was only 1.1 percent and 4.8 percent respectively in 1971 and 4.5 
percent and 14.2 percent, respectively, in 1980 (Cha, 1983).   
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In contrast to the generally accepted wisdom, FDI in South Koreas does not contribute much 
to local capability formation.  FDI definitely transfers production and management 
capabilities to ensure efficient production of foreign-designed products.  It does not, however, 
transfer engineering and innovation capabilities.  A comparative analysis of technological 
learning process and market performance between Hyundai Motor, an independent domestic 
firm, and Daewoo Motor, a joint venture with GM — the largest company with the largest 
R&D expenditures in the world — is illustrative.  Hyundai licensed technologies from 
multiple sources and took the responsibility to integrate them into a workable mass 
production system, entailing a major risk.  This approach forced and motivated Hyundai to 
assimilate foreign technologies as rapidly as possible throughout the process.  In addition, 
Hyundai invested heavily in R&D in attempts to accumulate design and innovation 
capabilities.  As a result,  Hyundai developed its first indigenous model "Pony," with 90 
percent local content in 1975, and it quickly improved its quality in subsequent years through 
serious R&D activities, making South Korea the second nation in Asia with its own 
automobile.  As a result, Hyundai's local market share in passenger cars increased from 19.2 
percent in 1970 to 73.9 percent in 1979.  Hyundai exported 62,592 cars to Europe, the Middle 
East, and Asia, accounting for 67 percent of South Korea's total auto exports in 1976-1980 
and 97 percent of total passenger car exports from South Korea in 1983-1986 (Kim, 1998). 
 
In contrast, constrained by GM's global objectives, Daewoo had relied on GM for technology 
sourcing, having done relatively little in the way of developing its own technological 
capability and even less in designing its own products.  Technology transfer in the form of 
joint venture is apt to lead to a passive attitude on the part of the recipient in the learning 
process, as the supplier guarantees the performance of the transferred technology.  The 
investment in product and process improvement undertaken by Daewoo between 1976-1981 
was only one fifth as great as those undertaken by Hyundai, although its production capacity, 
on average, was approximately 70 percent as large.  As a result, though their products were 
comparable in engine size and price, Daewoo was operating at 19.5 percent of capacity 
compared with 67.3 percent for Hyundai in 1982.  The differential in labor productivity was 
just as stark; only 2.61 cars per head at Daewoo compared with 8.55 cars per head at Hyundai.  
Conflicts between the two partners continued to plague the joint venture, giving the smaller 
Kia a chance to outpace Daewoo.  The 1992 divorce from GM finally freed Daewoo to set its 
own global strategic direction and navigate at its own ambitious pace, recapturing the second 
position after Hyundai. 
 
The semiconductor industry presents a similar story. MNCs transferred production capacity 
but not design or innovation capabilities. Signetics, Fairchild, Motorola, Control Data, AMI, 
and Toshiba began assembling discrete devices in South Korea in the 1960s and 1970s in 
order to take advantage of cheap local labor.  Operations involved simple packaging 
processes; bonded assembly operations by wholly owned South Korean subsidiaries of 
foreign corporations with all parts and components imported from the parent companies and 
re-exported back to the consignors.  The assembly operations required only about six months 
training of unskilled workers, transferring little design or engineering capability to South 
Korea.  It was the largest domestic companies — Samsung, Hyundai, and LG —  that 
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 marshaled investment to enter very large scale integrated (VLSI) chip design and production 
on their own.  Leading foreign producers refused to license VLSI technology to the South 
Korean chaebols.  But the chaebols were able to find a number of distressed small 
semiconductor companies in the United States which were ready to sell what the chaebols 
needed most — chip designs and processes — in attempts to fuel cash for survival.  To 
master the licensed technologies, Samsung set up an R&D outpost in Silicon Valley in 1983 
and hired five South Korean-American PhDs in electronics engineering with semiconductor 
design experience at IBM, Honeywell, Zilog, Intel, and National Semiconductors.  The 
outpost also provided opportunities for engineers in South Korea to participate in training and 
research in the U.S., enabling them to learn about VLSI technology (Kim, 1997b).   
 
The Asian crisis has, however, forced South Korean firms to pursue FDI in an attempt to 
mitigate pressing short-term cash flow problems.  In addition to peripheral businesses, core 
businesses went on the chopping block.  Consequently, in contrast to China and the Southeast 
Asian countries, which have witnessed a sharp plunge in FDI after the Asian crisis (e.g., 
Singapore - 24.8 percent and Taiwan and Malaysia -19 percent), South Korea saw a dramatic 
increase in FDI.  For example, FDI inflow in manufacturing drastically increased from $2.3 
billion in 1997 to $8 billion in 1998 and to $15.5 billion in 1999.  A lion’s share of the new 
FDI is associated with merger and acquisition of South Korean firms by foreigners.  Hewlett-
Packard purchased a 45 percent stake in its South Korean subsidiary from its joint venture 
partner, Samsung Electronics, for $36 million.  Dow Chemical took over Ulsan Pacific 
Chemical by purchasing a 20 percent stake.  Phillips purchased a 50 percent stake in LG’s 
highly profitable flat panel display business for $1.4 billion.  Volvo purchased Samsung’s 
construction machinery division for $730 million.  In short, the South Korean economy will 
be far more linked with foreign multinationals than ever before, but recent FDIs do not 
necessarily transfer new technology, as they are mostly involved in acquisition of existing 
South Korean firms.  They may however, transfer management know-how and improve 
transparency and accountability.   
 
Some MNCs recently established local R&D centers in South Korea.  Thirty-nine MNCs, or 
1.4 percent of the total number of MNCs operating in South Korea in manufacturing, have so 
far established R&D centers in South Korea. Thirty-three, or 82 percent, of them were 
established in the 1990s when South Korea had developed a significant R&D base. The R&D 
centers of multinationals however, account for less than 1 percent of the total number of 
corporate R&D centers.  Most of the R&D centers that multinationals operate in South Korea 
are involved in adapting their products to the local market, indicating that local R&D 
activities by mulitnationals are very insignificant compared to those by domestic firms in 
South Korea. 
 
More recent foreign investors such as Motorola and Lucent Technologies came to South 
Korea to tap South Korea’s leading edge technologies in semiconductor memory chips, flat 
panel displays, and code division multiple access (CDMA) mobile telecommunications — in 
which South Korea is ahead of Japan and the United States.  Motorola acquired a South 
Korean venture firm, Appeal Technology, to gain access to sophisticated design and 
innovation capabilities and to source one of the most compact mobile telephone sets for 
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 global marketing.  Lucent Technologies is in the process of establishing its R&D center in 
South Korea to tap it’s capability in telecommunications (Kim, 2000b).   
 
Domestic Industrial R&D Activities 
As South Korea underwent structural adjustments and entered progressively more 
technology-intensive industries, R&D investment became imperative to sustain its 
competitiveness in international markets.  As a result, R&D investment has seen a quantum 
jump in the past decades.  Table 1 (on page 19) shows that the total R&D investment 
increased from W.  10.6 billion (US$28.6 million) in 1971 to W.  3.349 trillion (US$ 4.7 
billion) in 1990, and to W.  12.858 trillion (US$ 12.8 billion) by 1997.  Though the South 
Korean economy recorded one of the world's fastest growth rates, R&D expenditure rose 
even faster than GDP.  R&D as percentage of GDP (R&D/GDP) increased from 0.32 percent 
to 2.69 during the same period, surpassing that of many West European countries.   
 
The government has launched various programs to induce the private sector to set up formal 
R&D laboratories.  Spurred partly by these programs and partly by increasing competition in 
the international market, the number of corporate R&D laboratories increased from one in 
1970 to 3,060 in 1997, reflecting the seriousness, with which South Korean firms have 
pursued high technology development.  The Chaebols have dominated R&D activities, with 
the 20 largest domestic firms accounting for 71.8 percent of total corporate R&D in South 
Korea.   
 
Over time, there has been significant change in the composition of R&D investment in South 
Korea.  The government played a major role in R&D activities in early years, when the 
private sector faltered in R&D despite the government's encouragement.  More recently, 
domestic firms have assumed an increasingly larger role in the country's R&D efforts in 
response partly to increasing international competition and partly to a policy environment 
supportive of private R&D activities.  In 1963, the private sector accounted for only two 
percent of the nation's total R&D expenditure.  This had risen to over 80 percent by 1994, 
which is one of the highest among both advanced and newly industrialized countries.   
 
The R&D growth rate has also been one of the highest in the world.  For instance, the average 
annual growth rate of R&D investment per gross domestic product (GDP) in 1981 through 
1991 for South Korea was 24.2 percent compared to 22.3 percent for Singapore, 15.8 percent 
for Taiwan, 11.4 percent for Spain, and 7.4 percent for Japan.  The average annual growth 
rate of business R&D per GDP is also the highest in South Korea (31.6 percent) compared to 
23.8 percent in Singapore, 16.5 percent in Taiwan, 14.0 percent in Spain, and 8.8 percent in 
Japan (DIST, 1994). 
 
In addition to intensified in-house R&D, South Korean firms began globalizing their R&D 
activities.  For instance, LG Electronics has developed a network of R&D laboratories in 
Tokyo, Sunnyvale in California, Chicago, Germany, and Ireland.  These outposts monitor 
technological change at the frontier, seek opportunities to develop strategic alliances with 
foreign firms, and develop the state-of-the-art products through advanced R&D.   In 
Sunnyvale, LG Technology plays a pivotal role in designing the latest personal computers, 
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 display terminals, and high resolution monitors, while the LG North American Laboratory in 
Chicago concentrates on HDTV, digital VCR, and telecommunications equipment.  Samsung, 
Daewoo, and Hyundai Electronics have developed equally extensive R&D networks.  
Samsung has R&D facilties in San Jose, Maryland, Boston, Tokyo, Osaka, Sendai in Japan, 
London, Frankfurt, and Moscow.  Daewoo has two in France, one in the U.K., and one in 
Russia.  Hyundai has R&D facilities in San Jose, Frankfurt, Singapore, and Taipei.   
 
Other important indicators of South Korea's rapid growth in industrial R&D are patent 
registrations in South Korea and abroad.  Patent activities in South Korea have significantly 
jumped in the last two decades compared to the previous two, increasing a mere 48 percent in 
the first 14 years (1965-1978), but almost tripling in the next 11 years (1979-1989) and 
almost tripling again in the next four years (1989-1993).  This reflects the increasing 
importance of intellectual property rights in the face of declining reverse engineering.  The 
gap is still great when compared with advanced countries, but South Korea is catching up 
rapidly.  Furthermore, the share of South Koreans in local patent registration also increased 
from 11.4 percent in 1980 to 58.9 percent by 1997, indicating rising technology activities.   
 
U.S.  Patent registration is often used as a surrogate measure of international competitiveness.   
The number of U.S.  patents granted to South Koreans is far less than to Taiwanese, let alone 
that in the advanced countries.   The cumulative number of U.S.  patents granted to South 
Koreans between 1969 and 1992 is only 1,751, compared to 4,978 to Taiwanese.  But South 
Korea jumped from 35th in terms of the number of patents in the U.S. with 5 patents in 1969 
to 11th with 538 patents in 1992 with an average annual growth rate of 43.32 percent (NTIS, 
1993).  This growth rate is the highest among countries in the NTIS report.   
 
The Asian crisis of 1997, however, appears to have exerted a significant influence over 
industrial R&D activities in South Korea.  To improve short-term liquidity, large chaebols 
reduced their R&D activities by about 13 percent during the year following the crisis, but the 
government increased its R&D budget, raising its share in total R&D from 23 percent in 1997 
to 27 percent in 1998.  However, South Korea’s total R&D decreased from W.12.185 trillion 
(US$12.8 billion) in 1997 down to W.11.336 trillion (US$9.5 billion) in 1998 (Kim, 2001).  
The disproportionate drop in terms of U.S.  currency is caused by the devaluation of the 
South Korean currency after the crisis.  The down-sizing of R&D activities by chaebols, 
together with the government’s promotion of venture businesses, led to a major surge of 
technology-based small firms in South Korea.  As a result, contrary to general expectations, 
the number of corporate R&D centers increased from 3,060 at the time of the crisis to 5,200 
two years later.  SMEs account for 95 percent of this increase. 
 
Despite decrease in R&D investment, R&D output in terms of patents increased significantly, 
indicating the improved quality of R&D activities.  The number of patents granted more than 
tripled in two years after the Asian crisis from 24,579 in 1997 to 80,642 in 1999.  The share 
granted to South Koreans also increased from 58.9 percent to 69.4 percent during the same 
period.   South Korea is now fifth in the world in 1999 in terms of the number of industrial 
property applications, following Japan, the United States, China, and Germany.  In terms of 
 industrial property applications by local residents per population, South Korea ranks second, 
with Japan taking first. 
 
The number of U.S.  patents granted to South Koreans almost doubled in two years from 
1,891 in 1997 to 3,679 in 1999, ascending from 7th in the world to 6th, only after Japan, 
Germany, Taiwan, France, and United Kingdom.  Samsung Electronics, one of the most 
R&D–intensive firms in South Korea, almost tripled its U.S.  patents granted from 582 in 
1997 to 1,545 in 1999, ascending from 17th to 4th, only after IBM, NEC, and Cannon.  Such a 
rise is significant compared to 49 percent increase in the total number of U.S.  patents granted 
to nonresidents during the same period, indicating that South Korea has been gaining rapidly 
in technological competitiveness after the crisis.   
 
Education 
South Korea is a land in which natural resources are comparatively scarce. Accordingly, the 
government and South Korean families have invested heavily in education, drastically 
expanding educational institutions in terms of quantity during the early decades, when the 
country was very poor.  Unlike most developing countries, South Korea’s expansion was well 
balanced at all levels prior to launching the industrialization drive. This produced a vast quantity 
of human resources with enough initial capacity to make sense of mature technologies 
transferred from abroad in the 1960s and 1970s. In more recent decades, however, the 
government did not focus on developing the quality of educational institutions, thus causing a 
major bottleneck in South Korea's technological learning.   The problem of under-investment is 
most acute at the university level.  All but a few universities have remained primarily 
undergraduate teaching-oriented rather than research-oriented.  The government has belatedly 
recognized this problem and contemplated ideas of making a major educational reform, but little 
was implemented prior to the Asian financial crisis. 
 
Nevertheless, university research did expand significantly in the 1990s.  R&D expenditure by 
universities almost tripled in five years from W244.3 billion ($341.2 million) in 1990 to 
W.1.27 trillion (US$1.6 billion) in 1998.  The number of university researchers also more 
than doubled from 21,332 to 51,162 during the same period.  In addition, emulating the U.S.  
experience, the government also introduced in 1989 a scheme to establish Science Research 
Centers (SRCs) and Engineering Research Centers (ERCs) in the nation's leading universities.  
The number of SRCs and ERCs increased from 13 in 1990 to 45 by 1997.  These centers 
receive research grants from the government for nine years. 
 
As a result, the number of scientific publications per year by South Koreans as quoted in 
science citation index (SCI) increased steadily from 27 in 1973 to 171 in 1980, but rapidly to 
1,227 in 1988 and 3,910 in 1994, and drastically to 10,918 by 1999, climbing from 37th in the 
world in 1988 to 24th in 1994 and to 16th in 1999.   
 
The Asian crisis prompted the South Korean government to formulate an ambitious education 
reform program, called Brain Korea 21, to transform a dozen of leading universities into first-
class research-oriented institutions.  The government earmarked W.1.6 trillion (about $1.4 
billion) to invest over seven years in order to implement the program.   Despite strong 
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 resistance from lower-tier universities, the government is determined to push forward the 
program.  It is yet premature to estimate the outcome of the program, but once implemented 
properly, it is expected to upgrade significantly the quality of scientists and engineers 
graduating from South Korean universities in the future.   
 
In addition, leading universities have established technology parks and venture incubating 
centers as a means to establish joint research with leading firms and to foster technology-
based small businesses spinning off from university R&D laboratories.   The implication is 
that universities will play an increasingly important role in South Korea’s pursuit of high-
technology industries in the future, a model that is familiar in the United States.    
 
Domestic Support Infrastructure 
In the absence of research in universities, the government took the initiative in establishing a 
Government Research Institute by recruiting overseas-trained South Korean scientists and 
engineers.  GRIs accounted for 83.9 percent of the nation's total R&D expenditures and 43.7 
percent of the nation's pool of researchers in 1970, reflecting their dominant role in R&D 
activities in early years.   
 
To keep pace with increasing industrial sophistication and diversity, the government 
established several specialized GRIs (e.g., chemical, machinery, electronics, ocean, 
standardization, nuclear energy, biotechnology, system engineering, aerospace, etc.) to serve 
the growing needs of the private sector.  GRIs began to play an important role in 
strengthening the bargaining power of local enterprises.   This helped to acquire increasingly 
sophisticated foreign technology, and in drastically cutting the price of foreign imports by 
developing competing technologies locally.   But most importantly, the GRIs generated 
experienced researchers for corporate R&D centers, and played a dominant role in 
undertaking various national R&D projects through the mid 1990s.   
 
In the face of the rapid expansion of private R&D activities, however, and increasing 
intensity of university R&D, the role of GRIs has decreased vis-à-vis universities and 
corporate R&D centers over time for two reasons.   First, GRIs are far less dynamic than 
corporate R&D centers.  The former is under the bureaucratic control of the government, 
which stifles the vibrant life of creative individuals by rigid regulations.  In contrast, the latter 
dynamically responds to market and technological changes for survival.  Second, GRIs face 
difficulties in retaining competent researchers, as these researchers hop either to academic 
institutions for prestige and freedom or to corporate R&D laboratories for better economic 
incentives.  Reform of GRIs to redefine their roles has been discussed for some time.  But 
inertia and the labor union of GRI members have made it difficult to implement the reform. 
 
The Asian economic crisis enabled the government to introduce a major restructuring of 
GRIs.  As part of public sector reform, the government introduced three research councils, 
modeled on aspects of the German and British systems, and reorganized GRIs under the 
jurisdiction of these councils, eliminating direct control by government ministries.  It might 
take some time before the new structure functions properly, but the restructuring is expected 
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 to result in increased administrative freedom and major reorientation of GRIs to address new 
missions.   
 
A critical problem remains unresolved. Government has largely been so preoccupied with 
mission-oriented projects that it has failed to develop effective infrastructure to support small 
and medium size enterprises.  The technical extension networks developed in the 1980s have 
not proved adequate to help SMEs grow technologically.  South Korea belatedly established a 
few industry-specific R&D institutes for SMEs in the 1990s, but their effectiveness remains 
to be seen. 
 
Corporate Governance and Management 
In addition to focus on core businesses and reduction in debt to equity ratio, chaebols face 
serious problems in the area of corporate governance.  In the environment where the state was 
the major source of constraints and contingencies, family owners of chaebols developed a 
“conservation-of-power rationality” (Klein, 1977).  They sought collusion with powerful 
politicians and technocrats in order to be able to enter lucrative businesses and to maximize the 
predictability of the environment.  Few family businesses could have grown into a chaebol 
without such political patronage in South Korea.  As family owners were more concerned with 
garnering outside influence than they were with generating internal capability in making their 
companies profitable, boards of directors and minority shareholders have had little power to 
curb the family owners’ mismanagement.  Moral hazards were prevalent.   
 
In the wake of the Asian crisis, the government introduced measures to change corporate 
governance of chaebols.  Listed companies must appoint outside directors to strengthen the 
independence of the board of directors in supervising top management.  Within the first year, 
752 listed companies had assigned outside directors.  But many companies hired their friends to 
the board.  In the future, it will be difficult for the company to do so, as institutional investors 
and minority shareholders will have the right to recommend outside directors.   
 
Another important arena is the improvement of management style in order to enhance 
effectiveness.  With so much of the firm's success resting on the top manager's personal skills, 
South Korean firms naturally adopted a top-down management style.  This management 
imperative, combined with the rule of military government over three decades, fostered a 
management style that resembled a military bureaucracy; hierarchical and centrally controlled 
but relatively less formalized.  The notion of Confucian traditions and its familism fits 
comfortably with the hierarchical style of family-centered conglomerates.  Unlike highly 
formalized bureaucratic organizations, South Korean firms were adaptable to changes once a 
decision was made at the top by the “commanding general.” These organizations were quite 
compatible with and efficient in imitative reverse-engineering and production-oriented tasks of 
the 1960s and 1970s.   
 
Many chaebols recognized the imperative of major changes to transform themselves into 
innovation-oriented organizations.  This requires more decentralized, self-contained, strategic 
business units that can respond quickly to changing markets and technologies; an 
organizational climate that nurtures creative individuals and effective teamwork; effective 
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 lateral communication and coordination across functions; and bottom-up communications to 
identify and respond quickly to market opportunities and threats.  There has been a lot of 
rhetoric on these issues but little action.   
 
The recent economic crisis has, however, forced chaebols to reform their organizations and 
management to be compatible with new needs.  Many chaebols are making major efforts to 
transform their organizational structures and management styles.  It will, however, take some 
time before results can be seen.  The chaebols find that although the formal organizational 
structure and management system can be changed overnight, changing the behavior of 
managers and employees to be compatible with the new system is far more difficult and time 
consuming. 
 
Labor Movement and Sociocultural Factors 
Another important element that influences the dynamics of technology development is the labor 
market and sociocultural environment, which set the stage for individual behaviors and social 
interactions in South Korea.   Although the formal ban on unions was lifted in the early 1960s, 
the legal framework in which unions were permitted to function was so restrictive that it 
virtually eliminated the possibility of organizing any genuine independent unions through 1987.  
In addition, the government used various means to suppress the labor movement in order to 
maintain industrial peace for rapid economic development.  As a result, workers became 
exceedingly docile. 
 
Then, following the democratization decree in 1987, the labor movement suddenly exploded in 
disorderly, violent, and in many cases unlawful ways.  But due to deteriorating social and 
economic climates, the once militant unions became relatively more matured and evolved into 
more responsible forces in the 1990s.  Nevertheless, a series of labor strikes have resulted in 
significant changes in the social and organizational climate.  There have been shifts in the power 
structure and workers have become far less submissive than previously.  One survey shows, for 
example, that those who agreed to obey to superiors’ directions dropped from 90.6 percent in 
1979 to 65.3 percent in 1991 (Shin and Kim, 1994).   
 
Many cultural and situational factors have affected South Korea’s work ethic (see Kim, 1997).  
After a decade of labor unrest, work ethic and discipline have deteriorated significantly.  
Constant demands for higher wages have also pushed South Korea’s real wage to over 91 
percent in terms of U.S. dollars, which was 2.8 times that of productivity, eroding South Korea’s 
competitiveness in international markets.  In addition, the new generation brought up in 
affluence appear less willing to work hard compared to the older generation.   
 
The Asian crisis has, however, exerted a major impact on labor in South Korea.  Facing the 
bankruptcy of banks and chaebols, the drastic downsizing of surviving companies, 
consequent high unemployment, and the reduction of the purchasing power of the average 
surviving worker by 30-40 percent, labor unions had to shift from a militant strategy to one 
that involves more bargaining and compromise, and workers have become  more willing to 
work harder than they were before the crisis. 
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Conclusion and Discussions 
South Korea’s phenomenal economic growth in the first two decades of its industrialization 
may be attributed to its strong system for national innovation.  But major strengths in the 
early decades have become liabilities in more recent times, as South Korea has failed to 
adjust to rapidly changing political and economic circumstances. This failure, together with 
mismanagement of the financial sector and foreign investor panic, led to a major economic 
crisis in 1997.  It is yet premature to assess the full impact of the crisis, as it is still unfolding 
and national economic performance appeared to take another downturn in 2001, in tandem 
with the slowing U.S. and global economies. 
 
The Asian crisis has undoubtedly affected painfully the economic and social life of South 
Koreans, yet, despite the negative effects of the crisis as widely reported in the news media, 
the crisis could also turn out to be a “blessing in disguise,” if policy makers and managers can 
use it as an open to transform South Korea’s outmoded economic and innovation systems, 
and to bring them more in line with requirements of the new millennium.   
 
South Korea has made significant strides in reengineering various critical elements in its 
innovation system.  The government, financial, domestic support, and corporate sectors have 
undergone a high doze of restructuring programs with noteworthy results.   Research and 
development activities at corporations and universities also produced significant results after 
the crisis, and worker attitude has improved noticeably.  But South Korea still has a long way 
to go, as experiences in such countries as New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom 
show that even with consistent efforts it takes a decade or more to see the substantial results 
of major reforms.   
 
This paper also poses several critical questions.  The first set of interrelated questions 
includes: Is South Korea making major changes to accommodate globalization after the Asian 
crisis? Is it possible for a small country like South Korea to sustain its technolonationalism in 
the face of increasing domination of innovation by larger, more technologically advanced 
countries? Is South Korea giving way its technolonationalism after the Asian crisis and 
moving toward technoglobalism?  
 
South Korea is evidently making major changes to accommodate to globalization.  Both the 
government and large firms are actively seeking foreign investment to attract new capital, 
new technology, and new management know-how, and to develop broader links with 
advanced industrialized countries.  The Asian crisis resulted in a major increase in FDI in 
South Korea, as mentioned earlier.  But do these changes signal a move toward 
technoglobalism? The answer is definitely “no.”  South Korea is willing to work more closely 
with multinationals to accommodate increasing globalization, but it will try to use every 
means to retain its own system of technological innovation and industrial production.  The 
government, for example, intends to increase public R&D funding from 3.47 percent of the 
total government budget in 1999 to 5.0 percent within a few years, indicating its 
determination to reinforce basic and mission-oriented applied research.  After the Asian crisis, 
the government launched a new initiative called the 21st Century Frontier Technology R&D 
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 Program, indicating South Korea’s efforts to crack cutting-edge technologies on its own.  The 
industrial sector also has similar goals.  Although the Asian crisis caused a major setback (13 
percent cut) of industrial R&D in South Korea and uncovered many problems in several 
sectors, they are only temporary phenomena.  It might take many more years before the 
financially troubled chaebols can again take up their R&D activities, but other firms have 
drastically intensified R&D activities after the Asian crisis to strengthen their international 
competitiveness.  Samsung Electronics, for instance, ascended from 17th in 1997 to 4th in 
1999 in terms of US patent registration, which is often used as a surrogate of international 
competitiveness.  South Korea may be the only country among newly industrialized 
economies (NIEs), in which many firms market their products under their own brands, a sign 
of its determination to survive on its own.  In short, increasing globalism in South Korea is a 
means toward a nationalist end.   
 
The second set of interrelated questions includes: Why does South Korea cling to 
technonationalism?  Is it possible for a small and weaker country like South Korea to survive 
to retain its technonationalism in a globalizing economy? South Korea is not a small country 
like Scandinavian or Benelux countries.  Its population size approaches that of France and 
U.K.  If North and South Korea united, its population would increase to well over 70 million, 
approaching that of Germany.  It is the perception of policy makers and managers that such a 
large country cannot prosper only as a production locale of and at the whim of multinational 
companies and that South Korea should have its own global strategy to determine its own 
destiny.  Japan could not have advanced as much, if it had followed Singapore’s strategy.   
 
Can South Korea succeed in the race of innovation and production increasingly dominated by 
larger technologically advanced countries? The answer is “it remains to be seen.” Like Japan, 
the South Korean government is determined to revamp its educational systems and strengthen 
its basic research capability.  Leading universities will be transformed from undergraduate-
oriented teaching schools into graduate-oriented research institutions.  It might take a decade 
or longer to bring them up to the level of advanced OECD countries, but changes will 
definitely be accelerated in the future.  Large firms will undoubtedly strengthen their R&D 
activities, as they approach closer to the world frontier.  In this process, South Korea will 
become a fully modern advanced industrial country. 
 
These efforts, however, may not be sufficient to sustain South Korean technonationalism.  
The worst case scenario is that South Korea might excel in a few sectors and become a smart 
follower in many others.  History tells that smart followers often outperform pioneers in the 
long run (Schnaars, 1994).  Even in technoglobalistic participation in innovation and 
production systems dominated by industrially advanced countries, smart partners can engage 
in more sophisticated technological activities and enjoy a greater degree of control and 
autonomy than otherwise.  And given local absorptive capacity, the diffusion of learning in 
such participation to local firms will accordingly take place effectively.    
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Table 1: Research and Development Expenditures, 1965-1998 
 
 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 
R&D expenditure 2.1 10.5 42.7 282.5 1,237.1 3,349.9 9,440.6 11,336.6 
Government 1.9 9.2 30.3 180.0 306.8 651.0 1,780.9 3,051.8 
    Private Sector 0.2 1.3 12.3 102.5 930.3 2,698.9 7,659.7 8,276.4 
Government vs.  
Private 
61:39    97:03 71:29 64:36 25:75 19:81 19:81 27:73 
R&D/GNP 0.26 0.38 0.42 0.77 1.58 1.95 2.51 2.52 
Manufacturing 
Sector 
        
R&D expenditure NA NA 16.7a 76.0 688.6 2,134.7 5,809.9 6,439.2 
Percent of Sales NA NA 0.36a 0.50 1.51 1.96 2.72 2.64 
Number of 
Researchers (total)b 
2,135 5,628 10,275 18,434 41,473 70,503 128,315 129,767 
Govt Research Inst. 1,671 2,458 3,086 4,598 7,542 10,434 15,007 12,587 
Universities 352 2,011 4,534 8,695 14,935 21,332 44,683 51,162 
    Private Sector 112 1,159 2,655 5,141 18,996 38,737 68,625 66,018 
R&D expenditure 
per researcher  (W 
1000) 
967 1,874 4,152 15,325 27,853 47,514 73,574 87,361 
Researcher per 
10,000 Population 
0.7 1.7 2.9 4.8 10.1 16.4 28.6 27.9 
Number of 
Corporate R&D 
Centers 
0                
1c 
12 54 183 966 2,270 3,760 
NOTES:  
a: for 1976. 
b: The figures does not include research assistants, technicians, and other supporting personnel. 
c: for 1971. 
Source: Ministry of Science and Technology 
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